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JUNE, 1943

THE BONES OF HADDOCK v. HADDOCK

Harold Wright Holt*

I
THE FACTS AND OPINIONS IN WILLIAMS

v.

NORTH CAROLINA

I

N 1940 0. B. Williams and Lillie Shaver Hendrix had been living
for twenty years or more with their respective lawfully wedded
spouses in North Carolina. In the spring days of May of that year
they went to Nevada. There on June 26 each filed a suit for divorce.
Carrie, the wife of 0. B. Williams, and Thomas, the husband of Lillie
Shaver Hendrix, remained in North Carolina. Neither of them was
served with process in Nevada. Neither appeared in the divorce proceedings. Each of them, however, seems to have had actual knowledge
of the institution of the suits.1 The Nevada court granted the divorces
-the first in favor of 0. B. Williams on the ground of extreme
cruelty on August 26, l 940, the second in favor of Lillie Shaver
Hendrix on the grounds of wilful neglect and extreme cruelty on
October 4, l 940. In each case the Nevada court found that "the
plaintiff has been and now is a bona fide and continuous resident of
the County of Clark, State of Nevada, and had been such resident for
more than six weeks immediately preceding the commencement of
this action in the manner prescribed by law." 2 On the day she obtained
*Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. A.B., Dartmouth;
LL.B., S.J.D., Harvard. Contributor to various law reviews.-Ed.
1 A North Carolina sheriff delivered in North Carolina to Carrie Williams a
copy of the summons and complaint in her husband's divorce proceeding. Service
by publication on Thomas Hendrix was had by publication of the summons in a
newspaper in Las Vegas, Nevada, and by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint in his wife's divorce proceeding to his last post office address (Akron, Ohio).
He had written his wife's Nevada attorney that he would sign the "original appearance." No appearance, however, was entered in his behalf. See State v. Williams, 220
N. C. 445, 17 S. E. (2d) 769 (1941), and Williams v. North Carolina, (U.S. 1942)
63 S. Ct. 207 at 209, note 2.
2 63 S. Ct. 207 at 209.
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her divorce Mrs. Hendrix, by a ceremony performed in Nevada and
valid under the laws thereof, was married to 0. B. Williams. Thereafter they returned to North Carolina, where they lived together until
indicted for bigamous cohabitation under a statute providing that

". . . If any person, being married, shall contract a marriage •
with any other person outside of this state, which marriage would
be punishable as bigamous if contracted within this state, and shall
thereafter cohabit with such person in this state, he shall be guilty
of a felony and shall be punished as in cases of bigamy. Nothing
contained in this section shall extend . . . fo any person who at
the time of such second marriage shall have been lawfully divorced
from the bond of the first marriage...." 3
As evidence to sustain their pleas of not guilty, 0. B. Willia.ms and
his co defendant offered exemplified copies of the Nevada divorce proceedings, claiming that the divorce decrees and the Nevada marriage
were valid in North Carolina as well as in Nevada. The .court, however, charged the jury at the request of the cotmsel for the state that
the divorce decrees, obtained after constructive service and without
appearances by the respondent spouses ( Carrie Williams and Thomas
Hendrix), would not be recognized in North Carolina.4 The court
also charged that the defendants had the burden of proving to the
satisfaction of the jury, but not beyond a reasonable doubt, the bona
fides of their residence in Nevada prior to the granting of the decrees.
To these charges Mr. Williams and his codefendant excepted. 'The
jury returned a general verdict of guilty. The state supreme court
affirmed the convictions/ holding that under Haddock v. Haddock 6
North Carolina was not required to extend full faith and credit to the
Nevada decrees under the clause of the Constitution that provides that
such faith and credit shall be given in each state to the judicial proceedings of sister states. The majority of the court also intimated that
the Nevada decrees were collusive in that the complainant spouses
(0. B. Williams and Lillie Shaver Hendrix) had not gained bona fide
domicils in Nevada.7
Mr. Williams and his codefendant then petitioned the Supreme

'

N. C. Code (Michie & Sublett 1939), § 4342.
Pridgen v. Pridgen, 203 N. C. 533, 166 S. E. 591 (1932), was given as fl
precedent.
5 State v. Williams, 220 N. C. 445, 17 S. E. (2d) 769 (1941).
6 201 U. S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525 (1906).
7 220 N. C. 445 at 459, 17 S. E. (2d) 769 (1941).
·· 3

4

1943]

HADDOCK OVERRULED

1015

Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari. It was granted.8
In its brief before that Court the state made the statement that there
probably was enough evidence in the record to require that the petitioners 9 be considered "to have been actually domiciled in Nevada." 10
Because of that statement and because the verdict against the petitioners had been a general one, the Court held that it had to assume that
the jury, in the light of the charges given, might have returned its
verdict solely on the ground that the Nevada decrees were not entitled
to full faith and credit under the doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock.
On the record in the case the Court held that it was presented with no
question as to the bona fides of the petitioners' domicils in Nevada. It
was not to consider the soundness of Bell v. Bell 11-that a decree of
divorce is not entitled to full faith and credit when granted on constructive service by the court of a state in which neither spouse was
domiciled. The Court could properly consider that matter only if it
felt that the decision of Haddock v. Haddock was correct. The majority of the Court felt that that case had not been properly decided.
Haddock v. Haddock was expressly declared overruled.12 Consequently
the overruling case-Williams v. North Carolina-is itself destined
for a career of comment and exposition.12a
Justice Douglas gave the opinion for the majority of the Court.
It may be summarized as follows:
The full faith and credit clause and the supporting legislation 18
require that with narrowly limited exceptions the judgment of a state
court shall have the same credit, validity and effect in every court in
the United States that it has in the state of rendition. 'the Nevada
decrees are valid and effective in Nevada. A suit for a divorce is not
Williams v. North Carolina, 315 U.S. 795, 62 S. Ct. 918 (1942).
0. B. Williams and Lillie Shaver Hendrix, petitioners in the Nevada divorce
suits, are hereafter from time to time referred to as "the petitioners."
10 63 S. Ct. 207 at 210.
11 181 U.S. 175, 21 S. Ct. 551 (1901).
12 63 S. Ct. 207 at 216.
12a See, infra, note 103.
13 "The records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any State or Territory
••• shall be proved or admitted in any other court within the United States, by the
attestation of the clerk, and the seal of the court annexed, if there be a seal, together
with a certificate of the judge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate, that the said
attestation is in due form. And the said records and judicial proceedings, so authenticated, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United
States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are
taken." Rev. Stat. (1875), § 905, 28 U. S. C. (1940), § 687.
8

9
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a mere in personam action-jurisdiction to give a decree of divorce
that will be entitled to full faith and credit rests with the state of
domicil of the complainant spouse, "at least when the defendant has
neither been personally served nor entered an appearance." 14 Nevada
requires a complainant to have a domicil in that state as a prerequisite
to obtaining a divorce. The Supreme Court of the United States could
not assume that the petitioners' domicils in Nevada had been fraudulent. "Rather we must treat the present case for the purpose of the
limited issue before us precisely the same as if petition~rs had resided
in Nevada for a term of years and had long ago acquired a permanent
abode there." 15
The validity of the Nevada divorce decrees was not to be attacked
on the ground that the Nevada court should have extended full faith
and credit to the divorce statutes of North Carolina. Nevada courts
would be under a duty so to do only if it could be shown that North
Carolina had some interest in Nevada's domiciliaries superior to the
interest of Nevada. That could hardly be. Nevada has a rightful and
legitimate concern in the marital status of its domiciliaries and may
alter within its own borders the marriage status of the spouse domiciled
there, even though the other spouse is absent. Even Haddock v. Haddock admitted that the Connecticut divorce decree therein involved,
though not recognized in New York, was binding upon both spouses
in the state of rendition. The concession of e:ffectiveness to the decrees
in Nevada makes more compelling the reasons for rejecting the theory
and result of the Haddock case.
It would be unfortunate to reach a result that one lawfully divorced
and remarried in Nevada is still married to the first spouse in North
Carolina. Such, however, would follow "from the legalistic notion
that where one spouse is wrongfully deserted he retains power over
the matrimonial domicil so that the domicil of the other spouse follows him wherever he may go, while if he is to blame, he retains no
such power." 16 Under that view the fault or wrong of one spouse in
leaving the other becomes a jurisdictional fact calling for final determination by the Supreme Court of the United States. There is no
reason, however, why the existence of state power should depend on
an inquiry as to where the fault in each domestic dispute lies; and no
distinction, so far as state power over divorce is concerned, should be
63 S. Ct. 207 at 213.
Id. at 210.
16 Id. at 214.

14

15
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drawn between a matrimonial domicil and a domicil later acquired.
The distinction between Haddock 'V. Haddock and Atherton 'V. Atherton11 is "immaterial, so far as the full faith and credit clause and the
supporting legislation are concerned." 18
Justice Frankfurter concurred specially.
Justice Murphy in his dissent reasoned that the petitioners had not
acquired a bona fide domicil in Nevada and that the decrees were not
entitled to full faith and credit in North Carolina, citing Bell v. Bell 19
and Andrews v. Andrews.20 Even if the decrees had legal effect in
Nevada, the interests of North Carolina were of such strength that
under the full faith and credit clause that state should not be compelled
to yield enforcement of its own public policy to that of the other state.
Justice Jackson also dissented. He said that the majority of the
Court hold that a divorce decree is not entitled to full faith and credit
if granted in a state in which neither spouse was domiciled. Granted.
It does not follow, he argued, that a state must have jurisdiction in
divorce if it is the domicil of the complainant spouse. Perhaps the
decrees had some effect in Nevada, but in the case before the Court
"there is no conceivable basis of jurisdiction in the Nevada court over
the absent spouses, and, a fortiori, over North Carolina herself.... in
its pre-occupation with the full faith and credit clause the Court has
slighted the due process clause." 21
It is "artificial and fictional" to speak of divorce as a proceeding
in rem and the marriage relationship as a res. Marriage is a continuing
relationship out of which duties to society and from one spouse to the
other arise, a relationship out of which arise rights in each spouse.
"It does not seem consistent with our legal system that one
who has these continuing rights should be deprived of them without a hearing. Neither does it seem that he or she should be summoned by mail, publication, or otherwise to a remote jurisdiction
chosen by the other party and there be obliged to submit marital
rights to adjudication under a state policy at odds with that of the
state under which the marriage was contracted and the matrimonial domicile was established." 22
17

181 U.S. 155, 21 S. Ct. 544 (1901).
63 S. Ct. 207 at 212.
19
181 U. S. 175, 21 S. Ct. 551 (1901).
20
188 U.S. 14, 23 S. Ct. 237 (1903).
21
63 S. Ct. 207 at 223.
22
Id. at 222.

18
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According to him the Court should make more than a formal
inquiry into the jurisdiction of the Nevada court. He seems to think,
as does Justice Murphy, that the petitioners did not acquire bona fide
domicils in Nevada. 23 The majority pay lip service, he asserted, to the
principle that a divorce decree asking for full. faith and credit should
be supported by the bona fide domicil of one of the parties within the
state of judgment. By its assumption without further inquiry, however, that the petitioners had acquired bona fide domicils in Nevada,
the Court is extending a trend to encourage the states to set up their
own standards of domicil and in effect the Court is repudiating domicil as the basis for jurisdiction to render a divorce decree entitled to
full faith and credit. 2 ¼ He failed to see how the majority decision
would ?,dvance the public good. -

II
THE UNsoLVED PROBLEM oF DoMICIL

As was indicated in Williams v. North Carolina, around the turn
of the century the Supreme Court of the United States held that a
state was not competent to give a divorce eD;titled to extrastate recognition under the full faith and credit clause if it were not the domicil
of at least one of the spouses. 25 It did not foIIow that an ex parte
divorce 26 granted at the domicil of the complainant spouse was not
entitled to full faith and credit. Extrastate recognition has in fact been
granted in some cases to ex parte divorces obtained by wives in states
other than those in which the husbands were domiciled.,2-7 In granting
such a divorce the court in effect would, expressly or by implication,
find that the wife was living apart from her husband for justifiable
cause and therefore entitled to a domicil apart from him for the purpose of obtainfog a divorce. 28 Extrastate recognition was seemingly held
due such a divorce in the absence of evidence that the wife had been at
fault in leaving the husband.20 "Justifiable cause" seems in most cases
28

Id. at 224.

u Id. at 225.
25 Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175, 21 S. Ct. 551 (1901); Streitwolf v. Streitwolf,
1.81 U. S. 179, 21 S. Ct. 553 (1901).
26 An ex parte divorce is one granted after merely constructive service on the
respondent spouse, who does not appear or plead.
21
Humphreys v. Humphreys, 139 Va. 146, 123 S. E. 554 (1924):
28 See I BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws, §n3.2 (1935).

E.g.,

20

Id.
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to have been determined by application of the law of the forum. 3~ Full
faith and credit were due an ex parte divorce obtained by a husband in
the state where he and his wife had last been matrimonially domiciled 81
and where he continued domiciled. 82 Extrastate recognition was also in
some cases given to an ex parte divorce obtained by a husband in a
state other than that of last matrimonial domicil.88 In a case of that
type a court in granting a divorce would :find, expressly or impliedly,
that the wife was at fault for the separation, hence domiciled with the
husband.84 The decree would receive extrastate recognition in the
absence of evidence in the later suit as to the party at fault, 35 or if what
evidence was introduced showed the wife to have been at fault for the
separation,86 or if the separation had been by mutual consent.87 Only
a few states, among them New York and North Carolina, came to
the point of refusing to hold that jurisdiction for divorce entitled to
extrastate recognition rested with the domicil of the complainant spouse,
although in some of these states, especially New York, the refusal was
subject to limitations and exceptions.38 Whatever Haddock v. Haddock
may have decided, the majority of the Court certainly held that an
ex parte divorce granted at the domicil of the husband was not necessarily entitled to full faith and credit. 89 How far the conflicting views
of the states as to divorce jurisdiction could be reconciled under the
reasoning of the Haddock case we need not consider.40
That case would never have come before the Supreme Court and
many perplexing problems would never have arisen had all the states
of the Union followed the view to which the Judicial Committee of the
30 See discussion in Holt, "Any More Light on Haddock v. Haddock?" 39
M1cH. L. REV. 689 at 702 et seq. (1941). But cf. Howe, "The Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees in New York State," 40 CoL. L. REv. 373 at 399 (1940).
81 "Last matrimonial domicil" designates the state in which spouses, being domiciled there, last cohabit as man and wife.
82 Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 21 S. Ct. 544 (1901).
38 E. g., Van Orsdal v. Van Orsdal, 67 Iowa 35, 24 N. W. 579 (1885); Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S. W. 977 (1910), semble.
84 See I BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAws, § 113.2 (1935).
~ I. d
•
at §l.13.10.
s6 Id.
s1 Id.
88 Id. at § 113.4 to 113.7. For a careful discussion of the development of the
New York law, see Howe, "The Reco1?nition of Foreign Divorce Decrees in New
York State," 40 CoL. L. REv. 373 (1940).
39 The bona fides of the husband's Connecticut domicil in the Haddock case at
the time he secured his divorce there was not questioned by the Court.
40 See Beale, "Haddock Revisited," 39 HARV. L. REv. 417 (1926).
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Privy Council gave utterance as late as 1926-that a married woman
cannot acquire a domicil apart from her· husband under any circumstances.41 Long before 1926, however,-long before Haddock v.
H addock,-the Supreme Court had held thaf a wife could gain a
domicil apart from her husband, at least for the purpose of suing him
for a divorce. 42 For that purpose the Rhode Island Supreme Court,
even before the Civil War, allowed a married woman to acquire a
domicil apart from the husband. 43 Haddock v. Haddock in no wise
disputed that doctrine. 44 . In the years intervening between the Hadtf,ock case and Williams v. North Carolina, the Court seems to have
found no opportunity to clarify its position on the matter of divorce
jurisdiction.45 It was, however, felt that a result of the Haddock case
was to make jurisdiction to render a divorce entitled to full faith and
credit turn on the question of fault in cases where the suit was brought
in the domicil of the complaining spouse, only constructive service was
had on the respondent and the latter did not appear or plead.46 That
feeling seems to have been well founded. Says Justice Douglas of the
majority view in the Haddock case:
cc ••• Furthermore, the fault or wrong of one spouse in leaving
the other becomes under that view a jurisdictional fact on which
tlus Court would ultimately have to pass." 47
·He is of the belief that
cc ••• The existence of the power of a state to alter the marital
status of its domiciliaries, as distinguished from the wisdom of its
exercise, is not dependent on the underlying causes of the domestic
41 Attorney General for Alberta v. Cook, [ I 926] A. C. 444- By statute, however, an English court may entertain a suit for a divorce brought by a wife who has
been deserted by the husband, if he was domiciled in England immediately prior to
the desertion. I Ed. VIII & 1 Geo. VI, c. 57, § 13 (1937). For Canadian legislation,
see the Canadian Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 20-21 Geo. V, c. 15 (1930).
42 Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. (76 U.S.) 108 at 123-124 (1869).
43 Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87 (1856).
44 "It has, moreover, been decided that where a bona fide domicil has been
acquired in a State by either of the parties to a marriage, and a suit is brought by
the domiciled party in such State for a divorce, the courts of that State, if they
acquire personal jurisdiction also of the other party, have authority to enter a decree
of divorce, entitled to be enforced in every State by the full faith and credit clause."
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 at 570, 26 S. Ct. 525 (1906), citing Cheever
v. Wilson, 9 Wall. (76 U.S.) 108 (1869).
.
45 Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. 551, 33 S. Ct. 129 (1913), affirmed the
Atherton case. Twenty-five years elapsed before Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32, 59
S. Ct. 3 (1938), was decided.
46 Delanoy v. Delanoy, 216 Cal. 27, 13 P. (2d) 719 (1932).
47 63 S. Ct. 207 at 214.
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rift .... It is one thing to say as a matter of state law that jurisdiction to grant a divorce from an absent spouse should depend on
whether by consent or by conduct the latter has subjected his
interest in the marriage status to the law of the separate domicil
acquired by the other spouse. But where a state adopts, as it has
the power to do, a less strict rule, it is quite another thing to say
that its decrees affecting the marital status of its domiciliaries are
not entitled to full faith and credit in sister states." 48
Seemingly, then, a married woman's acquisition of a domicil apart
from her husband is not to be questioned, so far as divorce jurisdiction
is concerned, on any score that she was "at fault" in leaving him. A
husband's ability to acquire a new domicil in a state other than that
where he and his wife have cohabited has always been independent
of his virtues as a husband. 49 Under Haddock v. Haddock a divorce
he obtained after constructive service upon the wife in a state other
than the state of matrimonial domicil might be denied full faith and
credit. If, however, she had been made personally subject to the
jurisdiction of the court by personal service within the state or by
her voluntary appearance, the divorce was entitled to full faith and
credit.50
Now a married woman's ability to acquire a domicil apart from her
husband is coequal with his to acquire one apart from her, at least so
far as the matter of divorce jurisdiction is involved under the full faith
and credit clause. Whether it is the husband or the wife who claims
to have gained a domicil apart from the other in the state in which a
divorce is sought, the divorce court is under no duty to inquire into
any question of "fault" other than, of course, "fault" under its own
law as a ground for divorce. In deciding whether or not a petitioning
wife has gained a domicil in the state, the court need not inquire into
what constitutes "fault" for the separation according to the law of the
state where the parties were last domiciled together as husband and
wife. This conclusion is strengthened ,by Justice Jackson's indicating
in his dissent that adequate support might be found from the decisions
of the Court for holding that a married woman could acquire a domicil
48
Id., citing I BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAWS, § l 13.1 l (1935), and CoNFLICT OF
LAWS RESTATEMENT,§ II3 (1934).
49
The Court in the Haddock case assumed that the husband had "wrongfully
fled" from the matrimonial domicil in New York, but also took for granted that he
had subsequently acquired a bona fide domicil in Connecticut.
50
See Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 at 570, 26 S. Ct. 525 (1906).

1022

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

apart from her husband for purposes of divorce without regard to ,any
question of "fault" for the separation.51
By way of an aside it is interesting at this point to speculate as to
how far the Supreme Court w:ill go in allowing spouses to have separate domicils. In Williamson v. Osenton 52 it was held that a married
woman could acquire a domicil apart from her husband in order to sue
his alleged mistress in a federal court under the diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction. There are decisions of the lower federal courts in accord
in allowing a married woman a domicil apart from her husband for
the purpose of suing in a federal court.53 And in ·recent years it has
even been held that without living apart from .her husband, a wife
could, pursuant to premarital agreement, retain a separate domicil. 54
It is significant that some of these cases are tax cases-suggesting
the power of State A to tax a wife as its domiciliary even though the
husband is a domiciliary of State B.55 Recent decisions of the federal
Supreme Court have indicated that the same individual may be subject to the taxing powers of more than one state under conflicting views
of those states as to where that person is domiciled.56
Is this theory of "multiple domicils" 57 to extend to taxation of
the "family unit?" For example, suppose that a man and his wife are
both persons of means. She·may be at a so-called summer home for a
far greater part of the year than he. He may maintain a substantial
home in New York, where his wife is present from D_ecember to June.
51
63 S. Ct. 207 at 2z3, note 6. Such seems to be the opinion of the New York
Supreme Court. McCarthy v. McCarthy, (S. Ct. 1943) 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 922.
52
232 U.S. 619, 34 S. Ct. 442 (1914).
58
Gordon v. Yost, (C.C.W. Va. 1905) 140 F. 79; Watertown v. Greaves,
(C. C. A. 1st, 1901) II2 F. 183.
64
Commonwealth v .. Rutherfoord, 160 Va. 524, 169 S. E. 909 (1933). Cf.
McCormick v. United States, 57 Treas. Dec. II7 (1930), and see discussion in
Younger v. Gianotti, 176 Tenn. 139, 138 S. W. (2d) 448 (1940). Note the following: "It is undoubtedly true that, by operation of law, the domicile of the husband
is, for many purposes, that of the wife, and that his domicile fixes her domicile for
purposes connected with' the marriage relation and •the duties of husband and wife.
Where a husband maintains several places of abode, to which his wife follows him
in the performance of her marital duties, she may choose for herself where she will
establish her voting residence,." Snyder v. Callahan, 3 N. J. Misc. 269 at 274, 129
A. 410 (1925).
55 Especially Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 160 Va. 524, 169 S. E. 909 (1933).
56
Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292, 58 S. Ct. 185 (1937);
Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398, 59 S. Ct. 563, 830 (1939).
57
"Multiple domicils" seems to be a convenient phrase to use when there have
been diverse adjudications in two or more states as to the domicil of a particular person
at a particular time.
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She then spends the rest of the year-save for an occasional absenceat a comfortable country place that she inherited in the western portion
of Massachusetts, in one of the resorts in Berkshire County. The husband will there spend a month's vacation in July, his week-ends
through August and September and every other week-end through
October and November. Other writers have ably shown the risk of
multiple taxation that this man is running by this mode of life-that
both New York and Massachusetts may successfully assert the claim
that he is domiciled within their respective borders and so subject to
the taxing power of each state.58 Ls it possible that even if he is able
to prove that his domicil is in New York to the exclusion of Massachusetts, both New York and Massachusetts might tax the wife as domiciled within their respective borders?
To resume the discussion from the point of diversion. The record
in Williams v. North Carolina and the admission by counsel for the
state were said to relieve the Court from considering the case upon
any basis other than that the petitioners had acquired domicils in
Nevada. Could not the Court have inquired into the question whether
the finding of domicil in Nevada was reasonable? Justice Jackson is
sure that the Court should have done so.
"While a state can no doubt set up its own standards of domicile as to its internal concerns, I do not think it can require us to
accept and in the name of the Constitution impose them on other
states. If Nevada may prescribe six weeks of indefinite permanent
abode in a motor court as constituting d9micile, she may as readily
prescribe six days. Indeed, if the Court's opinion is carried to its
logical conclusion, a state could grant a constructive domicile for
divorce purposes upon the filing some sort of declaration of intention. Then it would follow that we would be required to accept it
as sufficient and to force all states to recognize mailorder divorces
as well as tourist divorces. Indeed, the difference is in the bother
and expense-not in the principle of the thing." 511
After all, if, as the Court seems to assert, full faith and credit is
due the divorce decrees only if petitioners had domicils in Nevada, is
not the question whether they had done enough to acquire domicils
there one to be determined according to standards laid down by that
court which is the final arbiter of constitutional law-the Supreme
58

53

Tweed and Sargent, ''Death and Taxes are Certain....:...But What of Domicil?"
L. REv. 68 (1939).
59
63 S. Ct. 207 at 224.

HARV.
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Court of the United States? The self-denying attitude of the majority
of the Court is in striking contrast to the position of the majority in
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. 00 There the majority passed upon a
question of constitutional law not presented by the record and overruled precedents extending over almost a century.61
I; it the theory of the majority in Williams v. North Carolina that
Nevada's courts and legislature have untrammeled power to decide
what conduct is ;ufficient to enable one to acquire a domicil for divorce
in that state which will be entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere?
As to that we cannot be certain. It is submitted that the question
should receive a negative answer. Justices Jackson and Murphy have
clearly shown what their attitude will be when the question is squarely
presented.
Take the admission of the state's counsel that there was sufficient
evidence to justify a finding that the petitioners had "probably"
acquired a domicil in Nevada. What effect should be given to that
admission? That they "probably" acquired a "domicil" in Nevada
under Nevada standards? Or that they had acquired a "domicil" there
under North Carolina standards? We do not know. The Court does
not enlighten us.
In determining whether a person is domiciled in one subdivision of
a state to the exclusion of another, a state court may give the concept
of domicil a certain content. It does not follow that it may properly
give the concept the same content when the issue is whether or not he
is domiciled in that state to the exclusion of another.62 So far as the
issue of domicil arises in conflict of laws litigation and is tied up with
60

304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
The majority of the Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis, held that the
well-known doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (;p U. S.) I (1842), was, in the
language of Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer
Co. v. Brown'& Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 at 533, 48 S. Ct. 404
(1928), "'an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the Courts of the United
States which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate
to correct.'" Justice Brandeis also said: "Congress has no power to declare substantive
rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or
'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts." 304 U. S. at 79, 78.
Justices Butler and McReynolds dissented. Justice Reed, concurring in part, would
have avoided consideration of questions of constitutional law. The decision aroused
much comment, but this is not the place for further consideration of its significance.
Justices Black, Reed, Stone and Roberts, members of the Court at the time Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins was decided, are still members.
62
See Cheatham, "Internal Law Distinctions in the Conflict of Laws" 21 CoRN.
L. Q. 570 (1936).
61
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the problem of full faith and credit, it is submitted that it is the Supreme Court rather than the state courts that should decide the content
to be given the concept.
To date the Supreme Court, it must be admitted, has not shown
a willingness to undertake the task. The present Chief Justice has said:
" ... Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the full faith
and credit clause requires uniformity in the decisions of the courts
of different states as to the place of domicil, where the exertion of
state power is dependent upon domicil within its boundaries." 68
That statement was made in the course of a holding that it would
contravene the Eleventh Amendment to allow an administrator or
executor to interplead the taxing officials of two states under the Federal Interpleader Act of I 93 6 for a determination as to which of the
states was entitled to assess and collect death taxes as the state of last
domicil of the decedent.
When Texas v. Florida 64 came before the Court, the present Chief
Justice stated:
"· .. That two or more states may each constitutionally assess
death taxes on a decedent's intangibles upon a judicial determination that the decedent was domiciled within it in proceedings binding upon the representatives of the estate, but to which the other
states are not parties, is an established principle of our federal
jurisprudence." 65
Both majority and minority justices in Texas v. Florida were of
the opinion that any one of several states claiming to be the last domicil
of a decedent may exert governmental power by way of taxing the
succession to his intangible property as effectively as if no other state
made the same claim and exercised similar power. The exercise of
governmental power by one does not necessarily bar an exercise of
similar power by other states. The majority of the Court differed
from the minority in that the former made an exception in cases where
the tax claims of all the claimant states would more than consume the
assets of the deceased. For that reason the majority of the Court were
willing to have the Court undertake to decide where a decedent had
died domiciled.
63
Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292 at 299, 58 S. Ct. 185
(1937).
64
306 U.S. 398, 59 S. Ct. 563, 830 (1939).
65
Id., 306 U. S. 398 at 410.
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True, it may be, that the exercise of governmental power by State
A by levying certain taxes may not affect the similar exercise of
governmental power- by State B, even though both states base their
respective powers on the assumption that a certain individual departed
this life domiciled within their respective borders. In a case like Williams v. North Carolina, however, the exerci~e of governmental power
by Nevada to terminate a marriage does affect the exercise of a similar
governmental power by North Carolina. The Court grants Nevada
power to issue a decree of divorce entitled to full faith and credit at
the suit of a complainant spouse whom the Nevada-court has found to
be domiciled in that state, even though the respondent spouse was not
personally subjec;ted to the jurisdiction of the divorce court. North
Carolina is told that it must accept the termination of the marriage as
effective even though the respondent spouse has always had a North
Carolina domicil. If the tables had been turned and that spouse had
obtained in Nqrth Carolina a decree of divorce with only constructive
service on the spouse who had gone to Nevada, the Nevada court
would have been obliged to give full faith and credit to the North
Carolina decree. Obviously any justification for the Court's tolerance
of the exercise of governmental powers by two or more states based
on conflicting determinations as to domicil in cases of death taxes 66
does not apply to conflict of laws cases involving the extrastate recognition to be given divorce decrees.
One may have considerable sympathy with Justice Jackson's assertion that the Court should not have avoided passing upon the bona
fi.des of the petitioners' alleged domicils in Nevada. One may well be
of the opinion that it would be properly within the Court's province
to build up a body of case law for the guidance of state courts in conflict
of laws cases involving domicil. However, it has to be admitted that
it is the will of the majority that counts on the Supreme Court of the
United States as well as in less august tribunals.
The decision of the majority in Williams v. North Carolina has by
no means met with general approval. 67 It may be that action will be
demanded of Congress.68 As Justice Frankfurter pointed out, the ConI. e., taxes levied on successions to intangible personal property.
See 29 A. B. A. J. 78-80 (1943).
68 Senator Capper of Kansas has introduced into the United States Senate a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution to give Congress power to make
uniform laws for the whole of the United States on marriage and divorce, the legitimation of children, and the care and custody of children affected by annulment of
marriage or by divorce. See S. J. Res. 24, 78th Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 21, 1943. He
66
67
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stitution does not give Congress power to pass legislation regulating
divorce. 69 Nor may Congress enact a statute prescribing what shall
constitute domicil for divorce purposes. Yet it may be that there is
some opportunity for Congress to clear up some of the perplexities in
the matter of domicil in the conflict of laws. Justice Douglas refused
to consider whether Congress could except divorce decrees or any of
them from the operation of the full faith and credit clause. 70 Direct
authority is lacking.11 The full faith and credit clause is not to be taken
literally. A state is under no duty to enforce the judgment of a sister
state as if it were a domestic judgment. It is enough that a state recognizes failure to satisfy the judgment of a sister state as giving rise
to a cause of action in its own courts or gives the judgment the effect
of res judicata or estoppel or treats it as a merger. 72 There may be
exceptions to the operation of the full faith and credit clause so far as
judgments are concerned, but the room for exceptions may well be
described as "narrowing" rather than "narrow." 18 The Court does not
grant to a state in the matter of extension of recognition to a sisterstate judgment under the full faith and credit clause as much freedom
as it does in the matter of extension of recognition to statutes.74 May
Congress by statute permit the states to make exceptions to the operation
of the clause which the Supreme Court of the United States has been
unwilling to allow the states to make by their own judicial decisions?
Perhaps Congress may do so. Perhaps it may not. The Constitution is
"the supreme law of the land" for Congress as well as for the Supreme
Court. At present one can only guess how far the suggested legislative powers of Congress would be held to extend.15
By the Fourteenth Amendment all persons born or naturalized in
the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof "are citizens
of the United States and of the state wherein they reside." According
has also introduced a bill to provide for the uniform regulation of marriage and divorce:
S. 460, 78th Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 21, 1943.
69
63 S. Ct. 207 at 216.
70
Id. at 215.
71 Justice Douglas refers merely to the dissenting opinion of the present Chief
Justice in Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 at 215, note 2, 54 S. Ct. 181
(1933).
72 Yntema, "The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law,"
33 MICH, L. REV. 1129 (1935).
73 See opinion of Justice Douglas, 63 S. Ct. 207 at 211.
74 Id.
75 But cf. statement by the present Chief Justice in Yarborough v. Yarborough,
290 U.S. 202 at 215, note 2, 54 S. Ct. 181 (1933).
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to several decisions on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction in the federal courts, "reside" is to be interpreted or construed as "are domiciled." 76 A "citizen" of a state according to those cases is a "domiciliary" of the state.77 The Amendment further provides that
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." 78
Congress has passed statutes to implement the Amendment.79 It,
is not clear, however, what the powers of Congress are under the
Amendment to legislate on the matter of state domicil. It may be that
Congress could pass a comprehensive statute setting up minimum requirements for gaining a "domicil" and so a "residence" within a state.
It is interesting to note that in October I 942 Congress amended the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act by adding the following as Section 514:
"For the purposes of taxation in respect of any person, or of
his property, income, or gross income, by any State, Territory,
possession, or political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or by
the District of Columbia, such person shall not be deemed to have
lost a residence or domicile in any State, Territory, possession, or
political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or in the District of
Columbia, solely by reason of being absent therefrom, in compliance with military or naval orders, or to have acquired a residence
or domicile in, or to have become a resident in or a resident of,
any other State, Territory, possession, or political subdivision of
any of the foregoing, or the District of Columbia, while, and
solely by reason of being, so absent." 80
Perhaps this section would be held constitutional under the constitutional grant of power to raise and support armies.81 It suggests
76

Tudor v. Leslie, (D. C. Mass. 1940) 35 F. Supp. 969; Bjornquist v. Boston

& Albany R.R., (C.C.A. 1st, 1918) 250 F. 929, certiorari denied 248 U.S. 573, 39
S. Ct. 11 (1918); Delamire, L. & W. R. R. v. Petrowsky, (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) 250
F. 554, certiorari denied 247 U. S. 508, 38 S. Ct. 427 (1918). But cf. Pannill v.

Roanoke Times Co., (D. C. Va. 1918) 252 F. 910.
77
But obviously a domiciliary of a state is not necessarily a citizen of the state.
E.g., he may be a British subject.
78 U. S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 5.
79 E.g., The Civil Rights Acts, Rev. Stat. (1878), §§ 1977-J.991, 8 U. S. C.
(1940), § 41 et seq.
80
P. L. 732, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942), § 17.
81
For discussions of the constitutionality of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act, see Bendetson, "A Discussion of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
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an interesting query as to the constitutional power of Congress to
declare by statute that when full faith and credit are demanded for a
decree of divorce, no person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States need be deemed to have secured a domicil in a state merely by
sojourning there long enough to secure the decree. One may further
speculate on the powers of Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment to enact a code dealing with the acquisition, retention and loss
of domicil in a state. To draft any such code would require legal talent
of high order; and it is submitted that in the long run better results
would be reached if the Supreme Court would reverse its present
attitude and trace out, decision by dc!cision, a pathway for the guidance
of the state courts and of individuals.

III
HYPOTHETICAL FUTURE CASES

The majority of the Court in Williams v. North Carolina, as has
been pointed out, premised their decision upon the assumption that
North Carolina admitted that the petitioners had acquired a bona fide
domicil in Nevada. We have already seen how the Court (or the
majority of it) avoided determination of many questions that may
arise when the acquisition of a domicil of choice,82 as alleged by one
party to litigation, is disputed by the other. It may well be, however,
that in the near future a case compelling its deci~ion upon some of these
questions will come before it.
Suppose that a Mrs. Smith suspects that her husband is about to
remove from their home in State X to reside in Nevada just long
enough to procure a divorce. She is able to convince a proper court
in State X that her suspicions are well founded. She secures a decree
enjoining her husband from instituting, and proceeding with, a divorce
suit in Nevada. Mr. Smith, nevertheless, goes to that state and after
the lapse of the time required by the Nevada practice announces that
he has become domiciled in that state and sues there for a divorce.
Constructive service only is had upon Mrs. Smith and she does not
appear in the suit. The court of Nevada grants a divorce, finding that
Act of 1940," 2 WASH. & LEE REV. I ( I 940) ; Cockrill, "Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act of 1940," 27 A. B. A. J. 23 (1941).
82
"A domicil of choice is a domicil acquired, through the exercise of his own
will, by a person who is legally capable of changing his domicil." CoNFLJCT OF LAWS
RESTATEMENT,§ 15 (1934).
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Mr. Smith had acquired the requisite domicil in that state. The day
after the rendition of the decree, he marries in Nevada a second wife
-perhaps an old friend who came from State X about the time he did.
The newly wedded couple go back a day or two later to State X to live.
There Mr. Smith is brought before the court on charges of contempt
in that, in violation of the injunction previously mentioned, he had
instituted and prosecuted a suit for divorce in Nevada. Under state
statutes similar to those of North Carolina, he and the "second Mrs.
Smith" are also prosecuted for bigamous cohabitation.
Mr. Smith may convince the court before which he is held to answer
on charges of contempt that he ,had acquired a bona fide domicil in
Nevada at the time he began his divorce suit. For good measure he
may also convince the judge that the Nevada domicil had continued
until after the granting of the decree. Probably Mr. Smith would
thereby purge himself of contempt. State X would lack jurisdiction
to restrain a domiciliary of Nevada from there suing for divorce. Any
injunction of the State X court purporting to do so would be beyond
the competency of that court.83
In the criminal prosecution he may be equally fortunate in being
able to prove that he had acquired a Nevada domicil that was bona fide.
Under Williams v. North Carolina his acquittal should follow. The
"second Mrs. Smith" should also be acquitted, if it is assumed that
that lady was ]J:1.atrimonially unattached prior to the Nevada ceremony.
Suppose, however, that in the courts of State X Mr. Smith is held
not to have proven that he ever ceased t~ be a domiciliary of State X
by becoming domiciled in Nevada. The courts of State X hold that
the Nevada decree is not entitled to full faith and credit-that the
Nevada court had been induced by Mr. Smith's fraud to grant him a
decree. Williams v. North Carolina would certainly permit him to
bring before the Supreme Court of the United States the propriety of
the refusal of the State X court to extend full faith and credit to the
Nevada decree. Would the Supreme Court distinguish his case from
that of Williams v. North Carolina? In his case would the Supreme
Court hold that his acquisition of a domicil in Nevada had not become
a closed issue? In Williams v. North Carolina Justice Douglas did
speak of the obligation of North Carolina to take the Nevada decrees
"at their full face value,''" but it mu;:;t be remembered that at the outset
of his opinion he was careful to point out that the Court is not concerned
83 See Jacobs, "The Utility of Injunctions and Declaratory Judgments in Migratory Divorce," 2 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 370 (1935); 40 CoL. L. REv. 1255 (1940).
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with determining whether or not a decree of divorce was entitled to
full faith and credit when it had been granted on constructive service
by the court of a state in which neither spouse was domiciled. 84 He
further said that if Williams v. North Carolina had been tried and
submitted on the issue as to whether or not the petitioners in that case
had acquired a bona fide domicil in Nevada:
" ... we would have qll;ite a different problem, as Bell v. Bell
indicates. We have no occasion to meet that issue now and we intimate no opinion on it. However it might be resolved in another
proceeding, we cannot evade the constitutional issue in this case
on the easy assumption that petitioners' domicil in Nevada was a
sham and a fraud. Rather we must treat the present case for the
purpose of the limited issue before us precisely the same as if petitioners had resided in Nevada for a term of years and had long
ago acquired a permanent abode there." 85
The Supreme Court, then, did not hold that under the full faith
and credit clause the courts of all other states must accept as final and
without question an ex parte determination by a Nevada court of the
domicil of a person obtaining a divorce in that state. 86
In the hypothetical Mr. Smith's case the Supreme Court would
have to answer the question whether or not his domicil in Nevada had
been bona fide. Nothing in Williams v. North Carolina indicates that
the Court intended to overrule Bell v. Bell 8 1 and to hold that a decree
of divorce is entitled to full faith and credit even if granted in a state
in which neither spouse was domiciled and on constructive service. On
the contrary Justice Douglas said of a proceeding for divorce:

" ... Such a suit, however, is not a mere in personam action.
Domicil of the plaintiff, immaterial to jurisdiction in a personal
action, is recognized in the Haddock case and elsewhere as essential
in order to give the court jurisdiction which will entitle the divorce
84

63 S. Ct. 207 at 209-210.
Id. at 210.
86 The reader's attention is again directed to the admission by counsel for the
state of North Carolina that there was "probably'' enough evidence in the record to
require that the petitioners be considered "to have been actually domiciled in Nevada."
63 S. Ct. 207 at 210. A New York court has held that William v. North Carolina is
not controlling when the bona fides of the Nevada residence is challenged in the New
York court. Jiranek v. Jiranek, (S. Ct. 1943) 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 523. To the same
effect: McCarthy v. McCarthy, (S. Ct. 1943) 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 922; Oberlander v:
Oberlander, (Dom. Rel. Ct. N. Y. City, 1943) 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 139. See 43 CoL.
L. REV. 257 (1943).
87
181 U.S. 175, 21 S. Ct. 551 (1901).
85
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decree to extraterritorial effect, at least when the defendant has
neither been personally served nor entered an appearance." 88
Perhaps there will be a long line of cases before the Supreme Court
presenting the question whether or not persons obtaining divorces in
Nevada on constructive service were bona fide domiciled in that state.
Perhaps we are to see a substantial body of "case law" built up by the
Supreme Court on the acquisition of domicils of choice.
However, cases on divorce in the past have seldom gone to the
Court. The fears expressed in some quarters after the decision in the
Haddock case that the Supreme Court would be swamped with cases
involving the extension of full faith and credit to divorce decrees were
not justified by what actually occurred. 89 It may be that it will not be
the Supreme Court that will be called upon to clarify the law of
domicil. Such clarification may, as has been previously shown, come
from Congress. ,
It was assumed that the first Mrs. Smith did not contest her husband's Nevada suit nor in any manner subject herself to the jurisdiction of the Nevada court. Counsel may have advised her that if she did
contest the suit, a decision adverse to her on the issue as to her husband's acquisition of a Nevada domicil would preclude her under the
doctrine of res adjudicata as expounded in Davis v. Davis 90 from relitigating the issue in any other court in the United States in any proceeding between them in which she sought to have her marriage to him
held still existent. If she did not make herself a party to the Nevada
suit, the Nevada court would not be apt to hear of the injunction
granted in State X against Mr. Smith. Even if it did, would the Nevada court regard the injunction as material? If it found in Mr. Smith's
favor on the issue of his acquisition of a Nevada domicil, would not the
injunction be o~e of a foreign court that attempted to enjoin a domiciliary of Nevada from suing-for a Nevada divorce? Would it not in
the mind of the Nevada court be mere brutuni fulmen?
After Williams v. North Carolina counsel might well advise Mrs.
Smith to appear in the Nevada suit, challenge the jurisdiction of that
court on the ground that her husband had not acquired a bona fide
domicil in Nevada and plead the State X injunction as a bar. If she
were successful in refuting her husband's claim to be domiciled in
Nevada, his suit, it may be assumed, would be dismissed. If she were
88

63 S. Ct. 207 at 213 (italics the writer's), citing
LA.ws, § IIO.l (1935).
89
See, supra, at note 45 .
.9o 305 U.S. 32, 59 S. Ct. 3 (1938).

I
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not, he might obtain a decree. But would not Mrs. Smith be able to
go to the Supreme Court on the contention that the Nevada court had
denied full faith and credit to the State X injunction?
Direct authority is, of course, lacking. It is submitted that she
could. State X would certainly have jurisdiction to enjoin one of its
domiciliaries from suing for a divorce in Nevada.91 Regardless of what
former theory may have been as to an injunction-whether it merely
imposed a duty to the chancellor on the person enjoined or was an
adjudication of a right-duty relationship between parties litigantmodern conditions justify extension of the full faith and credit clause
to equity decrees as well as to judgments at law and to injunctions as
well as to decrees calling for affirmative action.92
If Mr. Smith continued to be a domiciliary of State X, the injunction from the State X court should receive full faith and credit in
Nevada. Surely the Supreme Court will not go so far as to hold that
Nevada's court is to have the ultimate decision as to whether or not
recognition was to be given to the injunction against Mr. Smith. If
Mrs. Smith should lose in the Nevada court, then, the Supreme Court
of the United States might be called upon to decide whether or not
the refusal of the Nevada court to give effect to the State X injunction
violated the full faith and credit clause. The Court could not, it is
submitted, answer the question without stating whether or not Mr.
Smith had satisfied certain minimum requirements for gaining a domicil
in Nevada. Perhaps the opportunities for the Supreme Court to build
up "case law" on the subject of domicil are brighter than was suggested
a short time ago.93
91

See 40 CoL. L. REv. 1255 (1940).
See Barbour, "The Extra-Territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree," 17
MICH. L. REV. 527 (1919); Messner, "The Jurisdiction of a Court of Equity over
Persons to Compel the Doing of Acts Outside the Territorial Limits of the State,"
14 MINN. L. REv. 494 (1930), and 39 YALE L. J. 719 (1930).
93
ln Goldstein v. Goldstein, 283 N. Y. 146, 27 N. E. (2d) 969 (1940), a
temporary injunction had been granted a wife restraining her husband from proceeding with a suit for divorce in Florida. She had received notice thereof by mail and
contended that the husband's claim of residence in Florida was false-that he, like
herself, was domiciled in New York, the place of marriage and matrimonial domicil.
The Court of Appeals held that the injunction should not have been granted because
if the wife's allegations were true, the divorce would be void and the only injury
caused thereby would be to the wife's feelings, for which there was no legal remedy.
See 40 CoL. L. REV. 1255 (1940).
But an injunction was granted to restrain a husband from proceeding with a divorce
suit in the Canal Zone in Selkowitz v. Selkowitz (N. Y. S. Ct. Spec. Term, 1943)
40 N. Y. S. (2d) 9. The court seems to have felt that the Goldstein case was
no longer to be followed after Williams v. North Carolina. The writer is informed
92
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From the foregoing it will not be difficult for the reader to imagine
what ]1light happen if the first Mrs. Smith accepted a defeat in the
Nevada court and Mr. Smith and the "second Mrs. Smith" returned
to State X and a zealous state's attorney prosecuted Mr. Smith and his
Nevada-won spouse for bigamous cohabitation. Under the de;cision in
Davis v. Davis 94 the first Mrs. Smith might not be able successfully
to question in State X the validity of her husband's Nevada marriage.
But whatever past practice may have been, in theory the decree of the
Nevada court would not preclude the state of X from instituting such
a criminal proceeding. 95 If Mr. Smith and his codefendant whom he
took for a wife in Nevada were convicted, we would have the case of
Williams v. North Carolina as a precedent for taking the constitutionality of the conviction before the federal Supreme Court.

IV
QuEsTIONs OF PROPERTY AND LEGITIMACY

Justice Douglas referred to certain cases (Fall v. Eastin,96 Olmsted
v. Olmsted 91 and Hood v. McGehee 98 ) as decisions which "refuse to
require courts of one state to allow acts or judgments of another to
.control the disposition or devolution of realty in the former. They
seem to rest on the doctrine that the state where the land is located is
'sole mistress' of its rules of real property." 99 He did not intimate
that these cases should be overruled-he did not indicate that he feels
that they lay down improper exceptions to the full faith and credit
clause.
It would seem to follow that if our hypothetical Mr. Smith did
secure on constructive service a Nevada divorce to which State X had
to extend full faith and credit as a termination of the marriage relation
between Mr. Smith and his first wife, the latter might still be entitled
that a bill has been introduced into the New York legislature to authorize actions for
injunctions against the institution or maintenance of pending or threatened divorce
actions in foreign states and countries, unless the respondent has been made subject
to the personal jurisdiction of the foreign court.
94
305 U.S. 32, 59 S. Ct. 3 (1938).
95 "Davis v. Davis • • • in no way indicates that a finding of domicile after
appearance of the absent spouse and litigation of the question would be conclusive upon
the state of his domicile in litigation involving its interests and not merely those of
the parties." Williams v. North Carolina, 63 S. Ct. 207 at 223, note 7, dissenting
opinion of Justice Jackson, comparing Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 at 172, note
13, 59 S. Ct. 134 (1938).
96
215 u. s. 1, 30 s. Ct. 3 (1909).
91
216 U.S. 386, 30 S. Ct. 292 (1910).
98
237 U.S. 6u, 35 S. Ct."718 (1915).
9
ll 63 S. Ct. 207 at 211, nofe 5.
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to dower or homestead or some similar interest in State X land owned
by Mr. Smith during the existence of his first marriage. There are
decisions to that effect, even from states which before Williams v.
North Carolina recognized as valid a divorce granted in the domicil
of the complainant husband with only constructive service upon the
wife. 100 These decisions would still seem valid under the full faith
and credit clause. Undoubtedly the "second Mrs. Smith" might also
be entitled to dower in lands in State X in which the first Mrs. Smith
also had dower. Conceivably interesting questions might be raised as
to how dower would be measured. ls the "second Mrs. Smith" entitled
to dower only in what is left after dower has been set off to the first
wife? Suppose that Mr. Smith were to acquire Nevada domicils from
time to time over a period of ten or fifteen years, in each case regaining
a State X domicil after a Nevada divorce from a previously won
"Nevada wife." If he were survived by four or five of these Nevadagained consorts, how would the dower of each be measured? Fortunately, f~w are the men who strive to emulate Henry VIII. The
suggested problem as to the measurement of dower will seldom arise
in such extreme form.
Any children born to the second marriage of Mr. Smith would
be legitimate so far as legitimacy depends on the validity of his second
marriage in Nevada. State X will probably not be able to discriminate
between children of the first marriage and children of the second to
the prejudice of the latter in matters of heirship to State X land owned
by Mr. Smith at his death intestate. No state will probably be able to
make any such discrimination in the matter of intestate succession to
such of his personal property as is within its jurisdiction to administer.
Such discriminations would seem to be contrary to the full faith and
credit clause and to the due process clause.
Troublesome questions may arise in the matter of. any claim by
the first Mrs. 'Smith to administration of Mr. Smith's estate if he
should predecease her intestate. Could State X by carefully drawn
statute give preference in administration to the first Mrs. Smith?
Statutes frequently give such preference to the "widow" of the deceased, but it would seem to be within the power of the state to give
preference to some other person. What is more important--could State
X continue in the first wife a right to share in his personal estate?
On these points we must wait for the guidance that is afforded by
100 Lynn v. Sentel, 183 Ill. 382, 55 N. E. 838 (1899); and see Harper, "Effect
of Foreign Divorce upon Dower and Similar Property Interests," 26 ILL.' L. REv. 397
at 407 et seq. (1931).
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judicial precedent. It may not be amiss, nevertheless, to refer the
reader to decisions that have granted letters of administration to women
from whom their deceased husbands had gained ex parte divorces in
states other than those of matrimonial domicil. 101
Finally, how about alimony? If the Nevada divorce is granted
Mr. Smith ;without contest and without personal appearance by the
wife, is she to be allowed later to sue him after his return to State X
for alimony? Alimony is usually granted as an incident to the granting
of a decree of divorce, but not necessarily so.102 It would seem as if State
X could properly authorize its court to make an award to the first Mrs.
Smith. Full faith and credit would still be rendered in State X to the
Nevada decree as an effective termination of the marriage relationship,
enabling Mr. Smith thereafter to contract another lawful marriage.
Nothing more would be required of State X according to the case of
Williams 'V. North Carolina. 103
It would not be fitting to say in the language of the stage that
Williams 'V. North Carolina has drawn the curtain on Haddock 'V.
Haddock. Rather we will shift the metaphor to say that the recent
case from North Carolina has largely stripped the flesh from the
earlier decision. Yet the bones of Haddock 'V. Haddock remainunbleached and unpulverized. Just as persons with mechanical turn
of mind may frame from blocks of wood puzzles of readjustment and
resetting, .so courts in states that do not favor free and easy termination of marriage may still find in the osseous remains of the Haddock
case material to fashion some puzzles for the Supreme Court of the
United States to solve-puzzles upon which law ,students and their
teachers in the meantime may speculate.
In re Grossman's Estate, 139 Misc. 646, 248 N. Y. S. 791 (1931); In re
Bennett's Estate, 135 Misc. 486, 238 N. Y. S. 723 (1929); and cf. In re Thomann's
Estate, 144 Misc. 497, 258 N. Y. S. 838 (1932), and Matter of Caltabellotta, 183
App. Div. 753, 171 N. Y. S. 82 (1918).
102
See 53 HARV. L. REv. II8o (1940).
103 The case under discussion in this article has been noted 43 CoL. L. REV. 116
(1943); II GEo. WASH. L. REv. 379 (1943); 28 lowA L: REv. 362 (1943); 27
MINN. L. REv. 403 (1943); 29 VA. L. REV. 657 (1943). And see Moore and
Oglebay, "The Supreme Court and Full Faith and Credit," 29 VA. L. REv. 557 at
597 (1943); Lorenzen, "Haddock v. Haddock Overruled," 52 YALE L. J. 341
( l 943); Rodman, "The Last of Mr. and Mrs.· Haddock?" 31 CoL. L. REv. l 67
(1943); Strahorn and Reiblich, "The Haddock Case Overruled," 7 Mo. L. REv. 29
( 1942) ; Barnhard, "Haddock Reversed; Harbinger of the Divisible Divorce," 31
GEo. L. J. 210 (1943); Cook, "Is Haddock v. Haddock Overruled?" 18 IND, L. J
165 (1943).
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